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Highlights
￿ Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires
persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation wor-
sens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the
two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and
debt sustainability is more severe.
￿ In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain
is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very
sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP
growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway
debt trajectory.
￿ The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak.
Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro-
area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national
policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken
the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More
effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Cen-
tral Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.
Zsolt Darvas(zsolt.darvas@bruegel.org) is a Research Fellow at Bruegel. The author
is grateful for comments and suggestions by Guntram B. Wolff, Francesco Papadia,
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1. In this Policy Contribution
we focus on the balance of
payments and sovereign
debt crises, but not the
banking crisis. Concerning
the latter, we only note that
banks in these countries
now hold even larger
amounts of the sovereign
debt of their home govern-
ments than before the
crisis, which makes banks
particularly vulnerable to
the deterioration of public
debt sustainability. Also,
banks in southern euro-
area members suffer losses
on their assets because of
the output fall and high
unemployment, which
limits banks’ ability to
supply credit to the real
economy, which in turn
deepens the output con-
traction and makes it more
difficult to achieve a sus-
tainable fiscal position.
2. Financial repression
refers to explicit or indirect
caps or ceilings on interest
rates and various regula-
tions that create and main-
tain a captive domestic
audience (such as pension
funds) that facilitate
directed credit to the gov-
ernment (Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2011).
SOUTHERN EURO-AREA COUNTRIESface a number
of challenges, such as achieving sustainable
public and private debt positions, sound banking
systems and improved competitiveness in the
midst of a deep economic contraction and high
unemployment, which are also fuelled by major
structural weaknesses. The triple crises of balance
of payments, banking and sovereign debt, and the
consequent growth crisis, are highly interrelated1.
Notwithstanding these difficult conditions, major
adjustments have been achieved – but much
more is necessary. For example, Italy’s almost 5
percent of GDP structural primary budget surplus
suggests that further fiscal consolidation may not
be needed. But Italy’s real exchange rate has
hardly corrected and the country’s export
performance remains weak, factors that call for a
major adjustment. Spain is in almost the opposite
situation: there has been a significant fall in unit
labour costs (ULC) and Spain's export
performance has been outstanding since 2008,
yet its large external debt necessitates further
improvements in exports, and a major fiscal
adjustment is also still ahead. In both countries,
the large stock of public debt means the fiscal
situation is vulnerable.
There are five major ways in which high debt ratios
can be reduced: fiscal consolidation, fast eco-
nomic growth, high inflation, financial repression2
and default (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). Of these,
sudden inflation reduces the real value of out-
standing debt, while a steady dose of inflation – if
the real interest rate is reduced because of, for
example, financial repression or other factors –
contributes to the lowering of the debt ratio. But in
order to regain price competitiveness, which was
generally lost in southern members of the euro
area before the crisis, low inflation or even defla-
tion would be needed.
Generally, lower expected inflation reduces nom-
inal interest rates and vice versa, as noted by
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Erwin Fisher a century ago. But this basic eco-
nomic law did not apply to intra-euro interest rate
developments during the euro's first decade,
because euro-area members' nominal interest
rates largely converged, while inflation develop-
ments were very different in different euro-area
members. And this law does not apply either to
current intra-euro area divergences in interest
rates. There is flight to safety and, because of the
shortage of AAA assets, investors are happy to
lend to Germany at a negative real interest rate
even for 10 years – sometimes even at a negative
or zero nominal rate for shorter maturities. In the
euro periphery, the possibility of sovereign default
and expectations of a euro exit could be the main
reasons for the still high interest rates. Therefore,
if inflation were to decline in the periphery, or if
prices fall, it would worsen the public debt outlook,
and nominal interest rates might therefore rise
instead of fall. By contrast, if, for example, infla-
tion were 1 percent instead of zero in the euro-
area periphery, nominal yields might even fall
because of the improved sustainability of public
debt.
There is therefore a conflict between achieving
fiscal sustainability (which would require 'high'
inflation) and competitiveness adjustment (which
would require 'low' inflation) when nominal inter-
est rates are not primarily driven by inflationary
expectations. This Policy Contribution presents
some numerical illustrations of this conflict, using
the examples of the two biggest southern euro-
area members, Italy and Spain. How severe is this
conflict? What is the role of symmetric adjustment
within the euro area? Would a European Central
Bank (ECB) Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT)
programme help to balance fiscal and competi-
tiveness adjustment? What policies would help
Italy and Spain to meet the recently opera-
tionalised fiscal rule on public debt ratio reduc-
tion? This Policy Contribution attempts to answer
these questions.03
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3. The overall actual bal-
ance is also influenced by
bank bail-outs. In the case
of Spain, in 2012 the one-
off and other temporary
measures (largely com-
prised of bank-bail outs)
increased the deficit by 3
percent of GDP.
4. An approximately 4 per-
cent of GDP increase in the
debt ratio is due to euro-
area bail-outs (bilateral
lending to Greece, EFSF –
European Financial Stability
Facility, ESM – European
Stability Mechanism).
Both Italy and Spain have recently implemented
major fiscal adjustments, as reflected in their
structural primary balances, which are expected
to improve from a surplus of 0.5 percent of GDP in
2009 to 4.8 percent in 2013 in Italy, and from a
deficit of 6.8 percent of GDP in 2009 to a deficit of
1 percent in 2013 in Spain. Due to the depressed
state of the economy, the actual primary budget
balance is worse than the structural balance. The
overall structural balance has also improved, but
less than the primary balance, because of
increased interest payments3. Gross public debt
increased by about 25 percentage points of GDP in
Italy and more than 50 percentage points in Spain
from 2008 to 2013, exceeding 130 percent of GDP
in Italy and 90 percent in Spain by 20134.
Both countries have succeeded in improving their
TABLE 1: ITALY AND SPAIN, MAIN MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
A. ITALY 1998-2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GDP growth Real potential 1.3 0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 -0.8 -0.4
Real actual 1.5 -1.2 -5.5 1.7 0.4 -2.4 -1.3
Nominal 4 1.3 -3.5 2.1 1.7 -0.8 0.2
Output gap 1.5 1.7 -3.6 -1.8 -1.6 -3.1 -4
Unemployment rate 8.7 6.7 7.8 8.4 8.4 10.7 11.8
Inflation Headline 2.3 3.5 0.8 1.6 2.9 3.3 1.6
Constant tax 3.5 0.8 1.6 2.6 2.5
Primary budget balance Actual 2.8 2.5 -0.8 0.1 1.2 2.5 2.4
Structural 1.3 0.5 0.9 1.4 4.1 4.8
Budget balance Actual -2.8 -2.7 -5.5 -4.5 -3.8 -3 -2.9
Structural -3.8 -4.2 -3.7 -3.6 -1.4 -0.5
Gross public debt 107.2 106.1 116.4 119.3 120.8 127 131.4
Current account balance -0.2 -2.9 -2 -3.5 -3.1 -0.5 1
Net International Investment Position -13.2 -24.1 -25.3 -23.9 -20.7 -24.4
B. SPAIN 1998-2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GDP growth Real potential 3.4 2.5 0.9 0.3 -0.2 -0.9 -1.4
Real actual 3.8 0.9 -3.7 -0.3 0.4 -1.4 -1.5
Nominal 7.7 3.3 -3.7 0.1 1.4 -1.3 0.1
Output gap 1.4 0.5 -4.2 -4.7 -4.1 -4.6 -4.6
Unemployment rate 11.1 11.3 18 20.1 21.7 25 27
Inflation Headline 3 4.1 -0.2 2 3.1 2.4 1.5
Constant tax 4.2 -0.4 1.3 2.4 1.7
Primary budget balance Actual 2.5 -2.9 -9.4 -7.7 -7 -7.7 -3.2
Structural -2.9 -6.8 -5.5 -4.8 -2.5 -1
Budget balance Actual -0.1 -4.5 -11.2 -9.7 -9.4 -10.6 -6.5
Structural -4.5 -8.5 -7.4 -7.2 -5.5 -4.4
Gross public debt 50.8 40.2 53.9 61.5 69.3 84.2 91.3
Current account balance -5.2 -9.6 -4.8 -4.4 -3.7 -0.9 1.6
Net International Investment Position -47 -79.3 -93.7 -88.8 -90.6 -91.4
Source: Net International Investment Position from Eurostat, all other indicators from AMECO, which is based on the European
Commission May 2013 forecast. Note: percent change for GDP growth and inflation; percent of GDP for all other variables.
THE CURRENT SITUATION
The Italian and Spanish economies are depressed
(Table 1). Actual and potential GDP are expected
to fall in 2013, while nominal GDP growth is prac-
tically zero. The output gap is expected to widen
to -4 percent of GDP (Italy) and -4.6 percent of GDP
(Spain) in 2013. Unemployment is on the rise.
Despite these depressed economic conditions,
consumer price inflation has hardly declined. Both
the headline and the constant-tax inflation in Italy
were higher than in Germany every year from
2008 to 2012. In Spain, headline inflation was
lower than in Germany only in 2009 (by 0.5 per-
cent) from 2008-2012, while the constant-tax
inflation was lower than Germany in 2009, 2011
and 2012 by 0.7 percent, 0.1 percent and 0.4 per-
cent, respectively, which are minor differences.5. See information about the
Macroeconomic Imbalance
Procedure, including
country-specific
recommendations:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/economic_governance
/macroeconomic_imbalance_
procedure/index_en.htm.
flow external imbalances, ie the current account
balance is expected to turn to surplus this year,
after reaching a large pre-crisis deficit in Spain
(minus 10 percent of GDP), less so in Italy (minus
3 percent of GDP). But the stock problem is still
there in Spain: the net international investment
position (IIP) shows a negative balance of minus
90 percent of GDP, which is very large (much larger
than the 35 percent threshold of the scoreboard
of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure –
MIP5), and largely comprises debt. Its service will
require major resources from the economy, while
reducing it towards the MIP threshold necessitates
sizeable trade surpluses. By contrast, Italy does
not have a major stock problem, since its net neg-
ative IIP is only about one quarter of GDP.
There is a major difference between Italy and
Spain in the drivers of the improvements of the
current-account balance. Spain's export perform-
ance has been even better than Germany's, but
Italian exports have remained much weaker
(Figure 1). Import compression has also been a
major factor, especially in Spain, where domestic
demand fell more significantly than in Italy. 
The calculations and literature survey presented
in Darvas (2012b) suggest that the ULC-based real
effective exchange rate (REER) is strongly related
to export performance. Figure 2 shows that the
ULC-REER relative to euro-area partners has not
yet adjusted in Italy – the euro-area country that
faced the highest pre-crisis real appreciation. The
REER calculated against non-euro area countries
depreciated somewhat, largely because of the
nominal depreciation of the euro from its highly
overvalued rate in 2007, but the index is still much
stronger than the historical average.
Spanish data looks better, and the fall in REER is
in line with the excellent export performance.
However, ULC improvements were largely
achieved through labour shedding (Darvas,
2012a) and the large external debt requires fur-
ther improvements in net exports. 
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Figure 1: GDP and its main components (2007Q4=100, at constant prices), 2005Q1-2013Q1
Source: Eurostat. Note: data is seasonally adjusted by working days.
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Figure 2: ULC-based real eﬀective exchange rate (2000Q1=100), 2000Q1-2011Q4
Source: the updated dataset of Darvas (2012a). Note: The indicators refer to the business sector excluding agriculture, con-
struction and real estate, calculated using constant sectoral weights. Since the indicators are noisy, we show the Hodrick-Prescott
filtered values calculated with smoothing parameter 1, a very low value, to get rid of the short term noise only.Zsolt Darvas  THE EURO AREA’S TIGHTROPE WALK
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6. For example, arbitrage
should ensure that the
current 2-year yield is the
average of the current 1-
year yield and the expected
1-year yield one year from
now.
The markets’ assessments of the sustainability of
public finances can be reflected in the secondary
market yields of government bonds. Italian and
Spanish yields still well exceed the yields in
Germany (Figure 3, left panel). We calculated,
using the expectation hypothesis of the term
structure (EHTS), the expected yields in the three
countries (Figure 3, right panel)6. We report the
results for the 6-year yields, because the duration
of public debt is typically about 6 years and
therefore the 6-year yield is a simple and
reasonable proxy for the average cost of new
borrowing. According to this measure of
expectations, yields are expected to increase in
all three countries in the next 5-8 years, after
which yields are expected to remain broadly
stable. The average expected spread relative to
Germany of the 6-year yield from 2014-2030 is
227 basis points for Italy and 239 basis points for
Spain, using market yields of 22 August 2013.
HOW TO FOSTER ULC-REER ADJUSTMENT?
We argue that beyond the vitally important struc-
tural reform agenda, further real exchange-rate
depreciation should play a major role in fostering
the external sustainability of countries with large
negative net IIP, like Spain. Italy does not have a
large negative IIP, but its exports have long been
losing market share and its economic growth was
low even before the crisis. Real exchange rate
depreciation could foster the development of the
tradable sector, which in turn could improve over-
all economic growth, because productivity growth
in the tradable sector is typically faster than in
other industries.
Since euro-area member countries do not have a
stand-alone currency, internal devaluation should
foster this adjustment. In this regard, there are two
important factors:
￿ Fiscal consolidation and internal devaluation
are interrelated;
￿ Developments in other euro-area countries,
including fiscal policy developments, have cru-
cial impacts on the adjustment that southern
euro-area members need to achieve.
By definition, domestic ULC declines if production
increases, employment falls, and the hourly wage
rate falls, all other things being equal. Certainly,
the most benign way of reducing ULC is faster
technological development, which results in
increased productivity and thereby production, if
labour input is unchanged. But stimulating such
technological development is easier said than
done.
Without sudden improvements in technology, ULC
can be reduced by cutting employment (relative
to output) and/or by reducing wages. Arguably,
adjusting through higher unemployment is
socially less preferable than adjusting through
lower wages. When there is downward wage rigid-
ity, domestic macroeconomic policies can have a
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Figure 3: Current and expected government bond yields, based on yields of 22 August 2013
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role in reducing wages. Fiscal consolidation
depresses output and employment, but also
depresses prices and wages and therefore most
likely reduces ULC too. Therefore, fiscal consoli-
dation can help – even if through a painful process
– to restore price competitiveness. But in turn,
lower prices increase the real value of the debt,
thereby endangering debt sustainability.
ULC should always be looked at relative to the ULC
of trading partners. The left hand panel of Figure 2
showed that while Spanish ULC relative to other
euro-area countries has fallen significantly since
2008, Italian ULC did not and German ULC
increased only slightly. The Spanish ULC fall was
largely the consequence of massive layoffs
(Darvas, 2012a). Therefore, if there is no sufficient
increase in German ULC and that other ‘northern’
euro-area trading partners, countries in southern
Europe will need deflation (which worsens debt
sustainability) or further massive layoffs (which
endangers social stability). In their elegant ana-
lytical paper, Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) also
showed that the relative fiscal position between
‘north’ and ‘south’ matters, ie if there is more fiscal
consolidation in the north, even more is needed in
the south.
PUBLIC DEBT SIMULATIONS
We use a simple numerical model with a few
behavioural equations and a number of account-
ing identities to simulate debt trajectories. We
highlight that our goal is not to produce a forecast:
that would require more detailed data, precise
estimation of behavioural parameters, and above
all, long-horizon forecasts for the driving variables,
such as economic growth, inflation and budget
balance. Instead, we make plausible assumptions
within a simple and transparent model to assess
various scenarios, and the differences between
the scenarios. Box 1 summarises the main
assumptions.
We calculate four scenarios for the public debt
ratio:
1 Baseline, as described in Box 1.
2 ‘Low German wages’: What if German inflation
remains low and therefore Italy and Spain need
to reach zero inflation to achieve the required
competitiveness adjustment? In this scenario,
inflation in Germany is 2 percent, zero in Italy
and Spain and the euro-area average is 1 per-
cent, instead of our baseline assumption of 3
percent inflation in Germany, 1 percent in Italy
and Spain, and 2 percent in the euro area. 
BOX 1: BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE PUBLIC DEBT SIMULATIONS
We make the following numerical and behavioural assumptions for the baseline scenario. For notes
to the assumptions, see the Annex:
￿ We take the end-2012 public debt stock and European Commission’s May 2013 forecast for
budget balance and GDP growth for 2013 as the starting point. 
￿ Potential GDP growth gradually increases by 0.1 percentage point per year from zero to 1 per-
cent per year in 10 years. 
￿ The baseline GDP deflator change is 1 percent per year.
￿ Phillips-curve is rather flat: a 1 percent lower output gap reduces prices by 0.1 percent.
￿ If there are no other shocks and no change in the structural primary balance, then the output gap
improves by 1 percent of GDP per year, until zero is reached.
￿ We define the fiscal effort as the change in the structural primary balance.
￿ Structural primary surplus as % of GDP:
￿ Italy: tiny change from a 4.8 percent surplus in 2013 to 5.0 percent from 2014 onwards; 
￿ Spain: 1 percent per year improvement from -1 percent in 2013 to 5 percent in 2019;
￿ In both countries, the 5 percent primary surplus is maintained in the long run.
￿ No additional privatisation revenues.
￿ Finally, we highlight an assumption that we do not make: the interrelationship between potential
growth and the adjustment of the real exchange rate.07
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7. See Darvas and Savelin
(2012) for the develop-
ments of the Italian, Span-
ish and German
government bond yields
after ten ECB actions
between January 2010 and
October 2012.
8. For example, in the US,
the Federal Reserve does
not buy the debt of states
such as California or New
York (which have debt of
about 10 percent of GDP),
but buys only federal
bonds.
3 ‘Fiscal fatigue’: What if the fiscal commitments
are weakened and the 5 percent of GDP primary
surplus is not sustained? In this scenario, after
three consecutive years with 5 percent of GDP
structural primary surplus, the primary surplus
is reduced to 4 percent of GDP. We note that this
is a rather small reduction in the primary sur-
plus in light of the historical volatility of this
variable.
4 ‘OMT activated’: What if the interest rate spread
to Germany is reduced from the current 227-
239 basis points to 150 basis points? Such a
reduction could be the consequence of the acti-
vation of the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transac-
tions (OMT), which in turn necessitates
applications by Italy and Spain for either a full
or a precautionary macroeconomic adjustment
programme from the European Stability Mech-
anism (ESM).
Of these scenarios, the last requires further qual-
ification. In the summer of 2012, Italian and Span-
ish yields started to increase very rapidly, despite
various ECB measures, such as the two rounds of
3-year long term refinancing operations (which
provided unlimited and cheap liquidity to banks)7,
and efforts by European heads of state, such as
the June 2012 declaration on the design of a Euro-
pean banking union to sever the link between
banks and sovereigns. But there was no lender of
last resort for euro-area sovereigns at that time. 
As highlighted by De Grauwe (2011), multiple
equilibria can characterise a monetary union in
which there is no lender of last resort for sover-
eigns of individual states. In the ‘bad equilibrium’,
financial markets can force these countries’ sov-
ereigns into default and perhaps even an exit from
the monetary union, but they could not if there
was a lender of last resort. The lack of such a back-
stop is not a substantial problem when the level
of debt is low8, but the debts of Italy and Spain
were either high or rapidly rising.
In the heightened situation during the summer of
2012, ECB announcements acted like a magic
wand: Italian and Spanish bond yields fell sharply
without any actual intervention. The first
announcement was the remarkable “whatever it
takes” speech of ECB President Draghi on 26 July
2012 (Draghi, 2012), pledging to use every
means available to a central banker to stabilise the
euro, at least within the mandate of the ECB. This
was followed on 6 September 2012 by the deci-
sion of the ECB Governing Council to establish a
new government-bond purchasing programme,
called Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). OMT
will be unlimited in principle, will treat the ECB pari
passu with other creditors, and will be based on
“strict and effective conditionality attached to an
appropriate European Financial Stability Facil-
ity/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM)
programme”(ECB, 2012). The financial assistance
programme can be full or precautionary. Currently,
no country qualifies for the OMT.
Has the OMT announcement in September 2012
led to the ‘good equilibrium’, ie a situation in which
government bond yields of euro-area members
are solely determined by their fundamental eco-
nomic and fiscal conditions, and not fears of an
eventual euro exit? The answer is no, for the
simple reason that there is still uncertainty about
the actual deployment of the OMT. In order to be
eligible for the OMT, Italy and Spain need to apply
for a financial assistance programme. Such an
application can only result from a complicated
negotiation process involving all euro-area gov-
ernments, the ECB, the European Commission and
possibly the IMF. It is not clear what the result of
such negotiations would be. Financial assistance
programmes for Italy and Spain, even if precau-
tionary, would necessitate a significant increase
in the resources of the ESM. Active OMT pro-
grammes for Italy and Spain might involve the pur-
chase by the ECB of a significant amount of Italian
and Spanish government debt, which would
increase the risks for the ECB. Those euro-area
members in which decision makers believe that
they have reached the limits of the solidarity they
can provide to other euro-area countries, may be
reluctant to agree to such a programme, or the pro-
gramme may not be comprehensive enough. Even
if a country is eligible for the OMT, the ECB has the
right to decide when and how much to purchase
(if at all). The interest rate at which the ECB would
intervene in government bond markets is also
uncertain. There are therefore so many uncer-
tainties that the actual approval of a financial
assistance programme for Italy and Spain, the
increase in the ESM's resources, and an actual
purchase of government bonds by the ECB must
reduce the spread of Italy and Spain relative to08
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Germany, which was expected to be around 227-
239 basis points on average during 2014-2030 on
22 August 2013 at the 6-maturity (as we use in
our simulations).
We stress that our assumption for the reduction of
the spread from current 227-239 basis points to
150 basis points is purely hypothetical. No one
can guess how much yields would decline as a
consequence of an ECB government bond pur-
chase under the OMT.
We also note that if Italy and Spain were under a
financial assistance programme (which is a nec-
essary condition of OMT), they could also borrow
from the ESM (and possibly from the IMF) at a
lower borrowing rate than the 150 basis points
spread over the German bunds as assumed in our
Scenario 49. But since our purpose with this sce-
nario is only illustrative, we did not add a fifth sce-
nario in which Italy and Spain borrow from the
ESM.
Let us now turn to the results of the simulations
and start with the baseline scenario. In Figure 4,
we compare our baseline scenario to the IMF’s
April 2013 projection and the debt trajectory
implied by the new debt rule. The IMF projection
goes to 2018. For both countries, our baseline sce-
nario is slightly more optimistic than the IMF’s pro-
jection during this period. Our longer-term
projection suggests that the debt ratio will con-
tinue to fall in Italy and will start to fall in Spain
after 2020 from a level of about 110 percent of
GDP, but the pace of debt ratio reduction is rela-
tively slow10.
The so-called ‘Six-Pack’, adopted by all EU member
states in 2011, operationalised the public debt
ratio rule of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP):
the gap between the actual debt level and the 60
percent of GDP reference should be reduced by
1/20th annually (on average over 3 years)11. As a
transitional arrangement, each member state in
excessive deficit procedure is granted a three-
year period following the correction of the exces-
sive deficit for meeting the debt rule. Italy’s
excessive deficit procedure was abrogated in the
summer of 2013 and therefore we calculated the
debt ratio trajectory implied by the debt rule after
2016. Spain’s new deadline to exit the excessive
9. The ESM lends at its own
borrowing costs plus a
minuscule surcharge. The
ESM has not yet issued
bonds. The spread of the
EFSF bond over German
bunds was about 55 basis
points on 22 August 2013
at the 6-year maturity. The
ESM may borrow from mar-
kets at a slightly lower rate
than the EFSF.
10. One reason for small
debt reduction after 2017 in
Italy and after 2023 in
Spain is that GDP growth is
no longer boosted by the
closure of the output gap.
As implied by the assump-
tions made in Box 1, the
output gap is eliminated in
the next four years in Italy,
and from 2019 to 2023 in
Spain (until then, the yearly
fiscal consolidation exactly
offsets the autonomous
correction of the output
gap).
11. See
http://europa.eu/rapid/pres
s-release_MEMO-11-
898_en.htm.
deficit procedure is 2016 and therefore we calcu-
lated the debt rule trajectory after 2019.
Figure 4 shows that debt ratio reduction under our
baseline scenario does not meet the requirements
of the operationalised debt rule of the SGP. The gap
between the baseline scenario and the debt rule
trajectory is especially wide, and widening, in the
case of Italy. For Spain, the main issue is that the
debt ratio reduction starts later than the required
date, though when the debt ratio reduction is pro-
jected to start, its pace is broadly in line with the
fiscal rule.
Figure 4: Public debt/GDP ratio: our baseline
scenario, IMF’s April 2013 projection and the
trajectory implied by the new debt ratio rule
Source: Bruegel.
Figure 5 on the next page shows the results of the
three alternative scenarios, ‘Low German wages’,
‘Fiscal fatigue’ and ‘OMT activated’. The figure
demonstrates that debt trajectories are very sen-
sitive to alterations in the assumptions. If inflation
has to be zero, instead of 1 percent as assumed
in the baseline, the debt ratio explodes in Italy and
stabilises at about 120 percent of GDP in Spain. If
fiscal commitments are weakened and the pri-
mary surplus is reduced from 5 to 4 percent of GDP
(which is a rather small reduction), the debt ratio
increases rather than falls in Italy, and the pace of
Spanish debt reduction abates. By contrast, if the
spread is reduced from 227/239 to 150 basis
points relative to Germany, the reduction in the
debt ratio is much faster.
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TRADE-OFFS
Using the model described in the previous section,
we can quantify various trade-offs. First, we
assess the situation in which inflation has to be 1
percent lower because of low German inflation, in
order to support the necessary competitiveness
adjustment between southern euro-area mem-
bers and Germany.  If inflation is 1 percentage-
point per year lower, to have debt dynamics
similar to those in our baseline scenario, then:
￿ Either the persistent primary surplus has to be
higher in Italy by 1.3 percent of GDP and in
Spain by 1.0 percent of GDP,
￿ Or the interest spread to Germany should be
reduced to approximately 130 basis points in
Italy and 160 basis points in Spain
.
Second, we check the implications of a reduction
of the spread to Germany from 227/239 to 150
basis points. In this case, in both Italy and Spain,
an approximately 0.8 percent of GDP lower struc-
tural primary surplus would produce the same
debt dynamics as our baseline scenario. There-
fore, spread reduction would bring a major relief
for fiscal consolidation.
And thirdly, we check what policy measures would
help Italy and Spain to meet the operationalised
fiscal rule on public debt ratio reduction. As we
have argued, for Spain the issue is that debt reduc-
tion starts later. Therefore, for Spain the deadline
for exiting the excessive deficit procedure has to
be extended by about two or three more years
beyond the current deadline of 2016. If we replace
our baseline assumption with:
￿ Either a 0.9 percent of GDP higher primary sur-
plus in Italy and 0.2 percent in Spain,
￿ Or 0.7 percentage point per year higher infla-
tion in Italy and 0.3 percentage point in Spain, 
￿ Or about 90 basis points lower interest rate
spread to Germany in Italy and about 10 basis
points lower spread in Spain,
then the debt ratio by 2030 would be the one
implied by the operationalised debt rule as
depicted in Figure 4. Therefore, meeting the oper-
ationalised SGP debt rule would not require a
major effort from Spain (if the deadline for exiting
the EDP is extended by two or three years), but
Italy would need to make more effort. The differ-
ence between the two countries is explained by
the difference in debt levels: since Italy has a sig-
nificantly higher debt level, but in our baseline
assumption we assume the same growth, inflation
and primary balance for the two countries, Italy
needs to do more to reduce her debt. 
CONCLUSIONS
The Italian and Spanish economies are depressed
with large negative output gaps and high unem-
ployment. Italy has a large structural primary sur-
plus (4.8 percent in 2013 according to the May
2013 forecast of the Commission), but Spain is
still expected to have a structural primary deficit of
1 percent, necessitating a major fiscal adjustment
in the years ahead. Unit labour costs have not yet
adjusted in Italy and have adjusted through labour
shedding in Spain; further adjustment is needed
in both countries. There is some, but insufficient,
market confidence, which is reflected in the 227
(Italy) and 239 (Spain) basis points expected 6-
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Figure 5: Public debt/GDP ratio: alternative scenarios
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year maturity spread relative to German bunds
from 2014-2030. According to our baseline sce-
nario for public debt, the projected pace of debt
ratio reduction is too slow in Italy, missing the
requirements of the SGP operationalised debt rule
by a wide margin. In Spain the debt ratio is even
expected to increase until about 2020 before
starting to decline gradually afterwards, ie about
2/3 years after the operationalised debt rule
applies to Spain, should the country exit the
excessive deficit procedure by the current dead-
line of 2016. And there are major risks because of
the high public debt ratios: even small negative
deviations from our assumptions, such as a some-
what lower long-term growth, inflation and primary
surplus, could easily result in a runaway debt tra-
jectory.
These simulation results paint a bleak picture. Per-
haps we were too conservative in making our
baseline assumptions. Economic growth might
pick-up faster and to a higher level than what we
assumed. The tradable sector might improve with-
out further real exchange rate depreciation. Future
interest rates might be lower compared to current
market expectations. But merely hoping for such
benign outcomes would amount to wishful think-
ing. Instead, forceful policies are needed to pursue
the dual goal of debt sustainability and improved
price competitiveness, beyond the badly needed
structural reforms aimed at fostering labour and
product market flexibility, greater public sector
efficiency, and banking sector clean-up.
Further fiscal consolidation beyond the 5 percent
primary surplus we assumed might be an option.
However, the case for further fiscal consolidation
is weak in the short and medium terms, when both
Italy and Spain have depressed economic condi-
tions, and high and rising unemployment. For the
longer term, history teaches us a lesson in cau-
tion. Over the last 50 years, no OECD country
(except Norway, thanks to oil surpluses) has sus-
tained a primary surplus above 5 percent of GDP.
Even sustaining a 5 percent of GDP primary sur-
plus (our assumption) for several decades could
prove to be politically challenging. Moreover, fur-
ther fiscal consolidation may not do much to help
the competitiveness adjustment when the
Phillips-curve is quite flat (implying that an even
greater negative output gap and even higher
unemployment might not do much to reduce
prices and wages). Even if the Phillips-curve
becomes steeper (ie prices and wages respond
more to changes in unemployment) due to struc-
tural reforms that enhance the flexibility of labour
and product markets, when there is a 5 percent of
GDP structural primary surplus, as we assumed in
our baseline scenario, there is a very little room
for further fiscal consolidation to depress output,
employment, and thereby prices and wages.
Instead of faster and larger fiscal consolidation in
Italy and Spain relative to our baseline assump-
tion, we see four complementary options to help
Italy and Spain (and other southern euro-area
members) to achieve the dual goal of fiscal sus-
tainability and improved price competitiveness,
beyond the necessary domestic structural
reforms.
First, a more symmetric intra-euro area price
adjustment should facilitate intra-euro area com-
petitiveness adjustment. If inflation has to be 1
percentage point lower in Italy and Spain because
the overall euro-area inflation rate undershoots
the two percent target, the persistent primary sur-
plus has to be higher in Italy by 1.3 percent of GDP
and in Spain by 1.0 percent of GDP, according to
our calculations. Consistent with the ECB mandate,
average inflation in the euro area should not be
allowed to fall below the two percent target, and
Germany and other euro-area countries with a
strong competitive position should refrain from
domestic policies that would prevent domestic
inflation from rising above two percent (Wolff,
2012; Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 2013).
Therefore, the ECB should do whatever it takes,
within its mandate, to ensure that inflation does
not fall below the 2 percent target. In July 2013,
the headline inflation rate in the euro area was
below target at 1.6 percent (compared to the same
‘Forceful policies are needed to pursue the dual goal of debt sustainability and improved price
competitiveness, beyond the badly needed structural reforms aimed at fostering labour and
product market flexibility, greater public sector efficiency and banking sector clean-up.’11
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12. The constant-tax infla-
tion indicator is not avail-
able for the aggregate
excluding energy, food,
alcohol and tobacco. Since
the constant-tax all items
inflation is below the head-
line inflation, the constant
tax inflation of the aggre-
gate excluding energy,
food, alcohol and tobacco is
now likely below 1 percent
per year, suggesting that
the underlying inflationary
trend undershoots the 2
percent target.
13. We note that a weaker
euro exchange rate may
increase the euro-area cur-
rent account surplus. The
euro area’s current account
is expected to reach a sur-
plus of about 2 percent of
GDP in 2013, after a decade
of being almost balanced.
The two main surplus coun-
tries, Germany and the
Netherlands, have slightly
larger surpluses, while for-
merly deficit countries are
now moving toward a bal-
anced position. The
increased euro-area current
account surplus was largely
absorbed by smaller sur-
pluses in emerging coun-
tries, which was the right
way of adjustment (Darvas,
2012b). In the future, euro-
area countries with large
surpluses should boost
their domestic demand,
which would reduce their
surpluses, and thereby the
external surplus of the euro
area would not widen too
much.
month of the previous year). But as Vihriälä
(2013) argues, the underlying inflation trends are
better reflected in indicators excluding volatile
food and energy prices and the impact of tax hikes
induced by fiscal consolidation programmes. As
Figure 6 shows, the inflation rate excluding
energy, food, alcohol and tobacco was 1.1 percent
in July 2013 and the constant tax rate inflation
rate was 1.2 percent, suggesting that we are head-
ing toward the ‘Low German inflation’ scenario of
our simulations12.
Figure 6: Euro-area inflation (compared to the
same month of the previous year), 1999-2013
Source: Eurostat.
Second, keeping inflation on target, which would
require further monetary easing, would weaken
the euro, which in itself would greatly facilitate
adjustment in southern euro-area members. This
is because the role of intra-euro trade has gradu-
ally declined, while the role of extra-euro trade has
increased. A weaker euro would also boost
exports, growth, inflation and wage increases in
Germany, thereby helping further intra-euro
adjustment, while the impact on Italian and Span-
ish wages would be limited because of high unem-
ployment (Darvas, 2012b). The ECB has a neutral
stance on the euro’s exchange rate and this posi-
tion will not change. But the difficulties of intra-
euro competitiveness adjustment, the risks of an
eventually less successful adjustment, and more
generally, the downside risk to the euro-area’s
economic outlook, should make the ECB more
open to further measures leading to an even more
accommodative monetary policy stance, when
inflationary expectations are below 2 percent. The
ECB has to do only what other major central banks
have done, and not more. This would weaken the
euro’s exchange rate13.
Third, the growth problem should be better
addressed both in southern Europe and in other
euro-area countries, beyond the vitally-needed
structural reforms. Economic growth is the key
parameter in debt sustainability. To help break out
of the downward economic spiral that southern
euro-area member states face, a very significant
European investment programme is needed for
southern members. The European Investment
Bank seems to be the best institution to carry out
such an investment programme. But much more
capital should be provided to it beyond the €10
billion agreed as part of 2012’s ‘Compact for
Growth and Jobs’, and the internal procedures of
the EIB should be revived to allow for much faster
disbursement of investment. Furthermore, weak
growth in the rest of the euro area has a negative
impact on southern European countries too. Fos-
tering growth throughout the euro area should be
a top priority. Beyond the vitally important struc-
tural reform agenda, the euro-area’s banking prob-
lems need to be assessed properly and bank
resolution and recapitalisation should be urgently
pursued (Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 2013).
This should be followed by a more appropriate
fiscal policy stance in those euro-area countries
that have fiscal space (Darvas, 2013).
Finally, if all else fails, the ECB will have to use its
OMT to reduce interest rate spreads. Our simula-
tion indicates that Italy and Spain would greatly
benefit from a reduced interest rate on new bor-
rowing. Reduction of the interest rate spread to
Germany from the currently expected 227/239
basis points to 150 basis point would allow a 0.8
percent of GDP lower primary budget surplus,
according to our calculations. Introduction of
Eurobonds, ie joint borrowing by euro-area
member states, is  not a realistic option in the fore-
seeable future. Therefore, as we have discussed,
the best option to achieve a lower interest rate is
the activation of the ECB’s OMT programme, which
-1
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in turn would necessitate Italian and Spanish
applications for at least a precautionary financial
assistance programme, and an increase in the
resources of the ESM14. In terms of adjustment
requirements, this would not lead to much
change, because the two countries are anyway
obligated to follow the Council's recommendations
because they are under the Macroeconomic
Imbalances Procedure. Also, Spain already has a
banking programme from the EFSF with condi-
tionality for the banking sector. It is quite unlikely
that a precautionary programme would make
many other demands compared to what the two
countries have to do anyway. Yet it may prove to
be difficult to agree on financial assistance pro-
grammes for Italy and Spain and to increase the
resources of the ESM, and the euro area may not
easily survive a scenario in which the ECB has to
buy large amounts of Italian and Spanish public
debt.
14. Spain’s current financial
sector programme does not
qualify the country for an
OMT programme. For an
OMT, either a full EFSF/ESM
macroeconomic adjustment
programme or a precaution-
ary programme has to be in
place. See:
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/
date/2012/html/pr120906_
1.en.html.
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15. The increase in con-
sumption taxes also con-
tributed to inflation in the
midst of the deep crisis, yet
the constant-tax consumer
price indicator of Eurostat
suggests that underlying
inflation was relatively high
considering the depressed
state of the economy, high
unemployment and the
need for a relative price
adjustment between euro-
area countries. Also, in Ire-
land the GDP deflator fell,
suggesting that the Irish
economy is more flexible
than the economies of
southern Europe.
16. For example, if potential
growth is 0.2 percent per
year and 1 percent of GDP
output gap is corrected,
then real GDP growth is 1.2
percent.
ANNEX: NOTES TO BASELINE SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS (BOX 1)
￿ We take the end-2012 public debt stock and European Commission’s May 2013 forecast for budget
balance and GDP growth for 2013 as the starting point.
By now, the situation with budget deficits, debts and the economic outlook is slightly worse than the May
2013 forecasts. However, there is no up-to-date comprehensive forecast for all of the required
macroeconomic indicators and our focus is on the medium- and long-run simulations, which would be
only marginally affected by a more up-to-date forecast for 2013.
￿ Potential GDP growth gradually increases by 0.1 percentage point per year from zero to 1 percent per
year in 10 years. 
This assumption is similar but slightly more conservative than the baseline scenario in Italy’s stability
programme, which assumes that potential growth increases from about zero in 2013 to about one percent
by 2018 and stays at this level thereafter. Spain’s stability programme assumes a negative potential GDP
growth rate at least until 2016 (the table in the stability programme presents yearly data only up to 2016)
and an average 1.2 percent per year rate in 2017-21, assumptions that do not differ much from ours.
￿ The baseline GDP deflator change is 1 percent per year.
This assumption is more conservative than the assumption in Italy’s stability programme, which assumes
an average 1.8 percent yearly change in the GDP deflator from 2013-18. Our choice is motivated by what
we see as a major need for a price competitiveness adjustment. We note that the baseline inflation is
altered when there is a change in the cyclical position of the economy, as described by the Phillips-curve
relationship below.
￿ Phillips-curve is rather flat: a 1 percent lower output gap reduces prices by 0.1 percent.
There have been major fiscal adjustments in Italy and Spain, yet prices have not declined, suggesting that
prices are sticky and the Philips-curve has to be flat15. The Phillips-curve may change because of, for
example, structural reforms that make prices and wages more responsive to the cyclical position of the
economy. However, it takes time for structural reforms to have an effect and in our model the output gap
gradually reverts to zero (see the next point) and the Phillips-curve matters only while the gap is non-zero.
￿ If there are no other shocks and no change in the structural primary balance, then the output gap improves
by 1 percent of GDP per year, until zero is reached.
This assumption is broadly in line with the assumption in Italy’s stability programme, which assumes
that the current 4.8 percent of GDP output gap corrects by about 1 percent per year in the next four years,
and the then remaining approximately one percent gap is corrected by about one-third of a percent per
year in the following three years.
The potential growth rate and the closure of the output gap define the real GDP growth rate16, and the real
GDP growth rate and the change in the GDP deflator determine the nominal GDP growth rate.
￿ We define the fiscal effort as the change in the structural primary balance.
There is now an extensive literature arguing that this is not the best measure, partly because the structural
balance calculations are imperfect. Yet this is the most widely used indicator and it is very easy to link
this indicator to public debt simulations.
￿ The fiscal multiplier is only instantaneous (within the year) and its value is 1, which implies that a 1
percent of GDP higher structural primary surplus reduces the output gap by 1 percent.
There is an intense debate about the size of fiscal multipliers, which also depend on the composition of
fiscal adjustment and the economic cycle. Some empirical papers argue that fiscal adjustment not only
has an instantaneous effect, but an effect spreading across several years. Yet there is a controversy
regarding the magnitude of fiscal multipliers and uncertainty about the composition of future fiscal
adjustment, which implies that it is not possible to make a sound assumption about the multiplier. Our
assumption should not be that far from the ‘middle’ of the range of the typical assumptions on the14
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multiplier, given the depressed states of the economies of Italy and Spain. Also, our assumption is simple,
thereby helping to keep our calculations transparent.
￿ Structural primary surplus as % of GDP:
￿ Italy: tiny change from a 4.8 percent surplus in 2013 to 5.0 percent from 2014 onwards; 
￿ Spain: 1 percent per year improvement from -1 percent in 2013 to 5 percent in 2019;
￿ In both countries, the 5 percent primary surplus is maintained in the long run.
This assumption is less ambitious than the assumption in Italy’s stability programme, which assumes a
6.1 percent cyclically adjusted primary surplus from 2016 onwards. However, we see the difficulties in
implementing further fiscal consolidation measures when unemployment is high. Also, over the last 50
years, no OECD country (except Norway, thanks to oil surpluses) has sustained a primary surplus above
5 percent of GDP. Even sustaining a 5 percent of GDP primary surplus (our assumption) for several
decades may prove to be politically challenging. 
￿ The gap between the structural and actual primary balance is 0.5 times the output gap.
For example, when the structural primary surplus is 1 percent of GDP and the output gap is minus 4
percent of GDP, then the actual primary deficit is 1 percent of GDP. We make assumptions about the
structural primary balance as a measure of fiscal effort (see above), but for calculating the debt stock,
the actual (primary and overall) balance is needed.
￿ No additional privatisation revenues.
While both countries plan to privatise, we remain on the conservative side by not assuming any
privatisation revenue.
￿ Expected future interest rates (ie the cost of borrowing in future years) are as implied by the expectation
hypothesis of the term structure, with the assumption of no term premium.
We note that the expected yield can be the average of two major outcomes, such as a benign scenario (in
which the southern countries will gain control over their public debt and the spread to Germany falls)
and a catastrophic scenario (in which the southern countries do not gain control over their public debt and
an unpredictable scenario would emerge). Politicians may argue that markets wrongly over-estimate the
probability of the catastrophic scenario, and therefore in the benign scenario spreads to Germany will be
lower than the current expectation. However, since government bonds with various maturities are traded
on the market, the expectation hypothesis of the term structure (EHTS) should provide the best guide to
expected future interest rates. Assuming lower interest rates compared to market expectations would
amount to wishful thinking.
A drawback of the use of market-implied expected interest rates is that they are consistent with current
market expectations of various variables, such as inflation, growth and budget balance, expectations
that are not known for the 20-year period of our simulations. This implies that the assumption we make
for all the variables may not be consistent. However, this drawback applies to all public debt simulations,
including those of the IMF and European Commission.
￿ We use the expected 6-year maturity yields as a proxy of the cost of new borrowing.
Since the duration of public debt is about 6 years, using the 6-year yields is a simple and straightforward
choice.
￿ Finally, we highlight an assumption that we do not make: the interrelationship between potential growth
and the adjustment of the real exchange rate.
We cannot exclude that a faster downward adjustment in the real exchange rate would facilitate the
development of the tradable sector. But because productivity growth used to be faster in the tradable
than in the non-tradable sector, a faster reallocation of resources toward to tradable sector could increase
aggregate productivity growth, and thereby potential growth of the whole economy. While we believe
that such an interrelationship exists, its quantification would rely on arbitrary assumptions that we wished
to avoid.